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STRONG-ARMING THE STATES TO
CONDUCT BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR
HANDGUN PURCHASERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF STATE AUTONOMY, POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE BRADY
HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT
From 1987, when the Brady Bill was first introduced,' until
November 1993, when President Bill Clinton signed the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act2 ("Brady Act"), people used handguns to kill
more than 150,000 Americans.3 Supporters of the Brady Act heralded
it as the "commencement of a heartfelt crusade for a safer and saner
country," and "the end of unchecked madness."4 Commentators referred
1. Former Representative Edward Feighan of Ohio introduced the first version of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on February 4, 1987. 133 Cong. Rec. 2737
(1987).
2. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A
(Supp. V 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3759 (Supp. V 1993)).
3. This number exceeds the number of Americans killed during World War 1, the
Korean War, and the Vietnam War combined. 139 CONG. REC. H10716 daily ed. Nov.
22, 1993 (statement of Rep. Derrick).
4. Ann Devroy, Brady Bill Is Signed Into Law - Gun Control Backers Hail Reagan,
Clinton, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1993, at A8 (quoting James S. Brady, former White House
press secretary, for whom the legislation is named); see also infra note 14 and
accompanying text (describing the events which ultimately precipitated the Brady Act).
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to the Brady Act as the "most far-reaching nationwide gun control
measure enacted in at least a decade." 5 The Brady Act mandates a five-
day waiting period for all handgun6 purchases from federally-licensed
sellers, during which time a local law enforcement officer must make a
reasonable effort to check the purchaser's personal history.7
Within five months after the Brady Act took effect,8 however, five
United States district courts heard arguments by sheriffs that the
background check provision9 violated the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.0 Four of these five courts held that the
5. Pierre Thomas, Checks on Gun Buyers Foil Some Criminals: Laws Like Brady Bill
Found to Be Effective, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1993, at Al.
6. The Brady Act defines handgun as "a firearm which has a short stock and is
designed to be held and fired by the use of a single hand; and ... any combination of
parts from which [such a] firearm... can be assembled." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(29) (Supp.
V 1993).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1933). A discussion of the Brady Act's provisions
appears in part I, infra. Some states that oppose a waiting period, such as Georgia, are
considering legislation to provide for instant background check systems. Gun Control A
Local Right, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 15, 1995, at A8 [hereinafter Gun Control]. The
Georgia legislation provides that in the event the Brady Act is "ever overturned in court
or repealed by Congress," the instant background check legislation will become void
immediately. Id.
The Brady Act does not affect states with laws that have the same or more stringent
requirements than the Brady Act. See H.R. RP. 103-344, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 12(1993) (hereinafter H.R. REp. 344]. This exemption applies to 23 states that have a
waiting period system, an instant check system, or a permit to purchase system. Id. Pierre
Thomas, Brady Gun Law Contains No Penalties, Little Money for States, WASH. POST,
Dec. 3, 1993, at A3. According to Congress, "The following states currently require either
a background check or a permit to purchase a handgun: California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin." H.R. Rap. 344, supra, at 9 n.16 (citation omitted). Utah
also requires a background check of handgun purchasers. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-526
(1995).
8. The Brady Act took effect ninety days after President Clinton signed the bill into
law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
10. See infra parts IL I & IV (discussing the case law concerning the constitutionality
of the background check provision).
The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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provision did in fact violate the Tenth Amendment." After holding the
provision unconstitutional, these four courts held the background check
provision severable from the Brady Act's other provisions. 2
This Recent Development examines the constitutionality of the
background check provision under recent United States Supreme Court
precedent on the Tenth Amendment and the proper separation of power
between Congress and the States. Part I discusses the purpose and
relevant provisions of the Brady Act. Part II defines the principle of
11. For a discussion of those decisions, see infra part II. In addition to the four
decisions holding the background check provision unconstitutional that are discussed in
this Recent Development, a United States district court in Louisiana also recently found
the same provision unconstitutional. Romero v. United States, No. Civ. A 94-0419, 1994
WL 794098 (W.D. La. Dec. 8, 1994). Sheriffs in North Carolina and New Mexico have
also challenged the provision. A lawsuit had been filed in Wyoming, but the Wyoming
district court dismissed the ease because the plaintiff-sheriff lost a reelection bid. U.S.
Judge Strikes Down Gun Checks, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 13, 1994,
at BI [hereinafter Judge Stie Down Gun Checks]; see Tom Diemer, Brady Law Stands
Despite Lawsuits, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 12, 1995, at A26.
In addition, the Maine State Legislature adopted a joint resolution that recommended
the Attorney General of the State of Maine "initiate a lawsuit soon as possible [sic] that
specifically challenges the continuing practice of enacting unfunded federal mandates ....
' 140 CoNG. REC. S5937 (daily ed. May 18, 1994). The Maine State Legislature
identified the Brady Act as an "unfunded federal mandate that is leading the State of
Maine and its municipalities to incur new expenses related to conducting criminal
background checks ... ." l
12. The courts declared the background check provision severable from the Brady Act
for a variety of reasons: they found the unconstitutional provision "functionally
independent" from the rest of the Act; the unconstitutional provision did not affect the
reach of the Act; the courts did not have to rewrite the Act to allow the remaining
provisions to function; and Congress would have enacted the Act without the unconstitu-
tional provision because the Gun Control Act, which the Brady Act amends, contains a
severability clause. E.g., Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1518-19 (D. Mont.
1994). Also, the unconstitutional background check requirement only provides a "stop
gap" measure until the national background check system becomes operationaL McGee
v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994). Severing the background
check provision has the effect of making the provision optional for CLEOs. E.g., Frank
v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994). The rest of the Brady Act's
provisions remain in effect. Id
Unlike the Montana, Arizona, and Vermont courts, which held the severable provision
did not apply to any law enforcement officer in the state, the Mississippi court held the
provision severable only for the particular CLEO challenging the provision. McGee, 863
F. Supp. at 328. The court ruled that the decision only applied to Sheriff McGee because
he had "standing to bring this lawsuit only insofar as it affect[ed] him in his official
capacity." Id. He lacked standing to bring the suit on the behalf of other Mississippi law
enforcement officials. Id The court named the Attorney General as the "appropriate
official to bring action of statewide import" Id.
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political accountability under the Tenth Amendment and its relationship
to federalism, relying on Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York v.
United States. 3  Part I reviews decisions that hold the background
check provision unconstitutional and analyzes those courts' application
of the principle of political accountability. Part IV critiques the
reasoning of the only district court that has held the background check
provision constitutional. Part V concludes that the background check
requirement of the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution, and offends the proper intergovernmental division of power
in our federal system, because it blurs the political accountability of
federal and state elected officials and consequently threatens the interests
of the people.
I. THE BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT
The 1981 assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan
seriously wounded White House Press Secretary James S. Brady and
inspired the Brady Act.14 The Brady Act is designed to prevent persons
not legally permitted to purchase handguns from obtaining these weapons
from federally-licensed gun dealers, importers, or manufacturers."5 To
accomplish this goal the Brady Act requires a chief law enforcement
officer (CLEO)' 6 to perform a background check during the mandatory
five-day waiting period for all handgun purchasers."
13. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
14. H.R. REP. 344, supra note 7, at 8. See generally Devroy, supra note 4 (discussing
the efforts of the Brady family leading to passage of the Brady Act).
15. H.R. REP. 344, supra note 7, at 7. The Act is specifically aimed at preventing
handgun purchases by "convicted felons and other persons who are barred by law from
purchasing guns .... " Id. According to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
estimates, the Brady'Act prevents about 2% (roughly 70,000) of all handgun sales from
occurring. Diemer, supra note 11.
16. The Act defines a CLEO as the "chief of police, the sheriff, or an equivalent
officer or the designee of any such individual." 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8) (Supp. V 1993).
17. The background checks are mandatory for CLEOs because the Brady Act allows
persons erroneously denied the ability to purchase a gun to sue CLEOs in order to compel
the approval of the transfer or to correct erroneous information. 18 U.S.C. § 925A (Supp.
V 1993); see McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (stating
that the Brady Act "directs sheriffs (as chief law enforcement officers) to ascertain if
obtaining a gun is in violation of the law"). CLEOs are exempt from civil liability for
obstructing a lawful transfer or failing to prevent an unlawful one. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7)
(Supp. V 1993).
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To purchase a handgun, a person must follow procedures listed in
the Brady Act.'3 The Act requires a licensed seller"9 to obtain a
Under the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993), four out of five federal
district courts have held that CLEOs are not subject to criminal liability. Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Mont. 1994) (reasoning that legislative silence
indicates that Congress did not intend CLEOs to be liable for criminal penalties, and
noting that it makes no sense to subject CLEOs to the more severe criminal penalties but
not civil damages); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(reasoning that Congress failed to clearly indicate its intent to hold CLEOs criminally
liable); McGee, 863 F. Supp., at 324 n.3 (agreeing with the government's interpretation
that criminal liability under § 924(aX5) does not apply to CLEOs due to the doctrine of
leniency, and precedent holding that interpretations of statutes that are arguably either
constitutional or unconstitutional should be treated by courts as constitutional unless
contrary to congressional intent); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Vt.
1994) (reasoning that criminal sanctions are unlikely because the government interprets the
Brady Act as not subjecting CLEOs).
In contrast, the Federal District Court in Arizona held that the Brady Act unequivocally
subjects CLEOs to criminal liability. Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372,1376 (D.
Ariz. 1994). The Mack court concluded that congressional application of criminal liability
to "whoever" clearly subjected CLEOs to criminal liability. Id. at 1376-77. The court
supported its position by noting that Congress specifically excluded CLEOs from civil
liability. Id. at 1375-76 n.4.
Assuming that CLEOs are liable only for injunctive relief, this liability alone is enough
to constitute a mandate. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 776-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (implicitly
recoguizing that liability for injunctive relief created a mandate). The Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), the statute at issue before the Court, required
state regulatory authorities and nonregulatory utilities to consider certain approaches to
structural rates, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d) (1982), and certain standards, 16 U.S.C. § 2623
(1982), within specific time frames. See 456 U.S. at 746-50. Although the statute
required states to consider these approaches, the statute did not impose any penalty for
noncompliance. Id. at 749-50. Despite the lack of a penalty provision, Justice O'Connor
described the procedures as those the state authority "muse' follow. Id. at 776-77
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). PURPA permitted "[a]ny person"
to bring an injunctive suit "to enforce the agency's obligation to consider the federal
standards." Id. at 779 n.5 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1976); 16 U.S.C.
§ 2633(cXl) (Supp. IV 1976)).
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. V 1993).
19. The Act only applies to handgun sales made by a federally "licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer." 18 U.S.C. § 922(1)(s)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
Because the Brady Act only applies to federally licensed gun dealers, unlicensed gun
dealers can sell to whomever they wish without complying with the criminal background
check requirements of the Act. Erik Larson, Brisk Trade: Private Gun Sales Go
Unregulated at Shows and at Flea Markets, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1994, at Al. "In fact,
many law-enforcement officers believe private sales will attract even more criminals now
that the Brady law's provisions ... have made retail purchase of handguns uniformly
tougher." Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
378 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 48:373
statement from the purchaser.2" The seller must then provide this
statement to the CLEO for the purchaser's place of residence. 1 The
seller then must wait five days before transferring the gun to the
purchaser,' during which time the CLEO must make a "reasonable
effort," through a background check, to determine whether the handgun
transfer will violate the law.' If, within that five-day period, the CLEO
provides no information to the seller or informs the seller that the
transfer is legal, the seller may transfer the handgun to the purchaser.24
20. The Brady Act defines a "statement" from a purchaser as:
(A) the name, address and date of birth appearing on a valid identification document
... of the [purchaser] containing a photograph of the [purchaser] and a description
of the identification used;
(B) a statement that the [purchaser] -
(i) is not under indictment for, and has not been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding I year,
(ii) is not a fugitive from justice;
(iii) is not an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act);
(iv) has not been adjudicated as a mental defective or been committed to a mental
institution;
(v) is not an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vi) has not been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions; and
(vii) is not a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, has
renounced such citizenship;
(C) the date the statement was made; and
(D) notice that the [purchaser] intends to obtain a handgun from the [seller].
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (Supp. V 1993).
Under certain circumstances a CLEO need not perform a background check. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(B)-(F) (Supp. V 1993).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 1993). The waiting period applies unless
the CLEO notifies the seller sooner that the transfer will not violate federal, state, or local
law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(ll) (Supp. V 1993).
23. A chief law enforcement officer to whom a [seller] has provided notice pursuant
to paragraph (1)(A)(i)(In) shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5
business days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law,
including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available
and in a national system designated by the Attorney General.
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
If a CLEO determines that the transfer would not violate any local, state, or federal law,
the CLEO must destroy the statement, and any records related to the handgun purchaser
created or obtained during the background check, within twenty days after receiving a
handgun purchaser statement. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (6)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993). If a CLEO
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The requirement that CLEOs perform background checks is a
temporary measure, valid until the United States Attorney General
establishes a "national criminal background check system." Congress
provided for the creation of such a system within five years after
enactment of the Brady Act.26 The new national system will replace
background checks performed by CLEOs by requiring licensed transfer-
rers of handguns to access the national database and check the
purchaser's backgroundY
finds a purchaser ineligible to purchase a handgun and the purchaser requests the reasons
for the denial, the CLEO must furnish the purchaser with a written statement of the
reasons within twenty days from the time of the request. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C) (Supp.
V 1993).
25. The two phase aspect to the Brady Act is distinguishable from the interim-
permanent phases contained in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
("Surface Mining Act"), the statute at issue in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The interim provisions of the Surface
Mining Act withstood a Tenth Amendment challenge because the Court held that the
statute only regulated individual companies rather than the states. Id. at 293. The statute
provided that during the interim period, the federal government would enforce the new
federal regulations and the states would have the option to continue enforcing some of the
regulations. Id. at 268. Upon reaching the permanent phase, the Surface Mining Act
provided that the states have the choice whether to regulate according to the federal
standards or have the federal government regulate. Id. at 271-72.
Regarding the roles of the federal and state government, the Brady Act differs from the
Surface Mining Act in two respects. First, the Brady Act requires state regulation of the
federal program in the interim phase. Second, the Brady Act gives the states no discretion
whether to carry out the federal regulatory program or not. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
26. Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103(b), 107 Stat. 1536, 1541 (1993) provides:
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF SYSTEM - Not later than 60 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall establish a national instant
criminal background check system that any licensee may contact, by telephone or by
other electronic means in addition to the telephone, for information, to be supplied
immediately, on whether receipt of a firearm by a prospective transferee would
violate section 922 of title 18, United States Code, or State law.
Id.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 922(tXl) (Supp. V 1993). Transferrers covered by the national system
provision include licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, and licensed dealers. Id.
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL AcCOuNTABILrrY
AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
In our federal system, the Tenth Amendment reflects the division of
power2s between federal and state governments.29 Federalism creates
a zone of state autonomy, which the federal government should respect
in certain areas, even if the federal government may constitutionally
regulate in those areas.3" This allocation of power between the federal
28. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.' U.S. CONST. amend. X.
29. See Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d. 339, 356 (1984) ("The Supreme Court has
affirmed the concept of federalism as a structural assumption of the Constitution.'), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984).
In United States v. Darby, the Supreme Court opined that "[t]he [Tenth] [A]mendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941). Justice O'Connor referred to the Tenth Amendment as a "tautology." New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2403, 2418 (1992).
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Tenth Amendment's implications
for state sovereignty in various ways. During the pre-New Deal era, the Court viewed the
Tenth Amendment as protecting certain sovereign powers of the states, such as the police
power, from federal encroachment. Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An
Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the
Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN. L. REV. 493, 494 (1993). The Court asked "whether
the activity regulated was within the realm of reserved state power and thus protected from
federal interference." Id. The New Deal era brought an "explosion of federal power."
Id. Following the New Deal, the Supreme Court referred to the Tenth Amendment as a
"truism," and held that state sovereignty was irrelevant to determining federal power. Id.;
see also Richard S. Myers, The Burger Court and the Commerce Clause: An Evaluation
of the Role of State Sovereignty, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1056, 1058 (1985) (discussing
the successes and failures of the Court in protecting state sovereignty); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 634 (1993).
30. Powell, supra note 29, at 639; see also Martin H. Redish, Doing It with Mirrors:
New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power To Require
State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 596 (1994).
Lawyers, scholars and judges continue to debate the Framers' intent regarding state
autonomy. Compare Joseph Lipner, Imposing Federal Business on Officers of the States:
What the Tenth Amendment Might Mean, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 907 (1989) (arguing that
the language and history of the Tenth Amendment indicate the Amendment was intended
to protect state autonomy) with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79
VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing that the framers intended national power to trump state
autonomy). See also Terrence M. Messonnier, A Neo-Federalist Interpretation of the
Tenth Amendment, 25 AKRON L. REV. 213 (1991). Other scholars argue that the
Guarantee Clause of the Constitution contains mechanisms to protect state autonomy. John
Minor Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels ofAmerican Federalism, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1063 (1984); see Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
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and state governments protects individuals from the danger of abuse by
a single sovereign." Federalism enhances and protects individual
political liberty by localizing government, and thereby encouraging
communication between elected officials and the electorate. 2 When
voters are in close contact with elected officials, voters have greater
control over policy decisions and resource allocation because the officials
are politically accountable.33 'Tolitical accountability, a necessary
feature of democratic federalism, is the 'answerability' of representatives
to the represented." Because elected officials must answer to the local
electorate, this dialogue gives the electorate power to influence political
choices to reflect majority voter preference. 5
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term -Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163, 178 (1992) C"mhe Guarantee
Clause provides a superior textual home for the theory of political accountability that the
New York Court unveiled.!).
Basically limited only by the political process, Congress has broad powers to regulate
state functions. Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1427 (1994) [hereinafter Federalism]. For congressional limitations
on state autonomy to pass constitutional muster, Congress must demonstrate that the
political system functioned effectively and empowered Congress to impose those
limitations. Id. Congress must assume accountability "for disturbing the ordinary,
constitutionally presumed balance of power between the federal and state governments."
Id.
31. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991).
32. See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 853-857 (1979) (arguing that localization of power enhances an
individual's opportunities for participation both quantitatively and qualitatively).
33. See New York, 112 S. CL at 2424.
34. D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process -
The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577, 640
(1985).
35. Id.
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In New York v. United States,36 Justice O'Connor" applied the
principle of political accountability to a Tenth Amendment analysis to
determine whether Congress had unconstitutionally limited state
autonomy. 8 In New York, the Supreme Court held that the take-title
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985'9 violated the Tenth Amendment because it forced states to
enact and enforce regulations.' The take-title provision was part of a
scheme Congress devised to induce states to open low-level radioactive
waste disposal facilities."1 Congress provided various incentives to
states to open disposal sites, and allowed states that did so to exclude
36. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
37. Justice O'Connor is a consistent supporter of state autonomy. See, e.g., Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,580-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the judiciary must protect state autonomy, the "essence" of federalism, from
the abusive power of the federal government); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,776-79 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Constitution's Framers intended a system of
separate state and federal legislative sovereignty); see also Ann Althouse, Variations on
a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J 979 (1993)
(discussing Justice O'Connor's approach to federalism).
38. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); see Powell, supra note 29, at 650 (referring to a Tenth
Amendment analysis in New York). But see David M. O'Brien, The Supreme Court and
Intergovernmental Relations: Fhat Happened to "Our Federalism"?, 9 J. L. & POL. 609,
614 (1993) (stating that Justice O'Connor "dismissed the Tenth Amendment" in New
York).
If the federal government infringes on state autonomy, the Tenth Amendment directs
the judiciary to scrutinize the means employed by the federal government. New York, 112
S. Ct. at 2418; see Powell, supra note 29, at 650.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988).
40. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2429. More specifically, the Court declared that "the
provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the
Constitution." Id. at 2429; cf Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 766 (1982) (FERC) (stating that the state could either consider federal
regulations or stop regulating in the field, even though the federal government had no
"alternative regulatory mechanism"). New York and FERC are distinguishable. In New
York, Congress required states to carry out a federal initiative, although it gave the state
schoices. 112 S. Ct. at 2415-16. In FERC, Congress allowed states to shift the cost of
regulation to the federal government. 456 U.S. at 749-50.
New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428-2429. Justice O'Connor based her majority opinion on
"constitutional history and precedent." New York, 112 S. Ct. 2408. But see Prakash,
supra note 30, at 1960 (criticizing Justice O'Connor's historical analysis of federal power
to compel states to enforce federal laws); Levy, supra note 29, at 500 (criticizing Justice
O'Connor's reading of the Framers' intent regarding the Tenth Amendment).
41. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
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waste from other states.42 The take-title provision required states unable
to provide for disposal of waste generated within their borders, after a
certain time, to assume ownership of the waste.4'
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor noted that prior cases
held that Congress "lack[ed] the power directly to compel the States to
require or prohibit [certain] acts."'  However, she stated that Congress
may regulate private activity directly or may enlist the aid of states by
urging, rather than forcing, them to adopt a federal program.45 Under
the Constitution, Congress may regulate private activity pursuant to its
Spending Power' or under the Commerce Clause.47 Furthermore, if
Congress regulates an activity directly it may preempt state regulation of
the activity. Thus, Congress can offer two choices to the States: first,
regulate according to federal standards, or have state standards preempted
by federal regulations; 4' or second, regulate according to federal
standards or forego federal funds.5" According to Justice O'Connor,
both options preserve state officials' political accountability and allow
state electorates to influence state policy decisions.5 State officials
remain politically accountable because they make decisions, and are then
answerable to their electorates for their decisions. Political accountability
ensures the continued political liberty of the people. 2
When Congress creates incentives for states to enforce federal
programs, Justice O'Connor emphasized, state residents retain the ability
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2) (1988); see New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(dX2XC) (1988).
44. 112 S. CL at 2423.
45. Id. at 2423-24.
46. "The Congress shall have Power... to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
47. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
48. 122 S. Ct. at 2424.
49. Id. at 2424 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) and FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-65).
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2423.
51. Id. at 2424.
52. See Kaden, supra note 32, at 856-57. Political liberty is "the freedom to
participate in the community's political life." Id. at 856.
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to choose whether to undertake regulation.53 State officials, accountable
to the state electorate, will make a decision in accordance with state
voter preference.' In making that decision, state officials must balance
the benefits to the state against the costs to the state if the state chooses
to implement the federal program.55
Justice O'Connor implied that if federal officials could force states
to regulate federal programs, voters would hold state officials account-
able for the reallocation of state resources needed to operate the federal
programs.56 In addition, Justice O'Connor pointed out that federal
officials would "remain insulated" from the political ramifications of
their decision to force states to regulate according to a federal pro-
gram.57 As a result, "accountability of both state and federal officials
[would be] diminished.""8 Loss of political accountability undermines
the federal system by sabotaging the "Constitution's intergovernmental
allocation of authority."59 Justice O'Connor implied further that loss of
53. 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. In an earlier case, Justice O'Connor expressed the belief that Congressional
coercion of states limited the political accountability of state and federal officials leaving
citizens feeling that their state officials did not represent their interests. FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 779 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
57. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424. State officials bear the cost of federally-mandated
state regulations, when it is the federal government that should have to answer for its
actions. See Althouse, supra note 37, at 1017-19.
58. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
59. Id. at 2432. Justice O'Connor reasoned that federalism should protect individuals
from domination by a single sovereign by splitting sovereignty between the national
government and the state government Id. at 2431. Laws that result in a lack of official
accountability run counter to "the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority,"
and federalism. Id. at 2432. But cf La Pierre, supra note 34, at 639. Professor La Pierre
argues that the national political process holds federally elected officials politically
accountable to the national electorate for any federal laws that reduce state autonomy. Id.
Therefore, as long as the democratic process checks congressional legislation that intrudes
on state interests, the judiciary should not intervene in the political process. Id. at 642.
According to La Pierre, these political checks on federal intrusion into state interests are
twofold: the electorate judges the substantive policy towards private activity and then
judges the financial and executive expenditure to administer and enforce the national
policy. Id. at 643-44. Because Congress must face these two checks by the national
electorate, Congress becomes politically accountable to the national electorate for the
decision to limit state autonomy. Id. at 644. If the voters support the federal officials who
impose these burdens, then the voters also support federal reduction of state autonomy.
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accountability undermined the essence of democracy - a government
responsive to the preferences of its citizens.'
I. DECISIONS HOLDING THE BACKGROUND CHECK
PROVISION UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Federal district courts in Montana,6' Mississippi,62 Arizona,63
and Vermont" declared that the background check provision of the
Brady Act unconstitutionally undermines Tenth Amendment protection
of state autonomy in the federal system.65  While supporters of the
Brady Act might perceive these decisions as "frontier justice rather than
Id.
Professor Kaden, however, argues that changes in the internal political structure of the
U.S. government reduce congressional "sensitivity" to the problems of preserving state
autonomy. See Kaden, supra note 32, at 857-68. Professor Kaden also implies that the
electorate's proximity to local government increases accountability of local elected
officials, and consequently, increases individual political liberty. Id. at 854-57. The
implication of Professor Kaden's theory is that Congress, sitting a distance from the
electorate, may not be as accountable to the people as a local government Thus,
congressional decisions to limit state autonomy may not reflect the national preference.
Professor Kaden's theory also applies to local-state division of authority. The National
Rifle Association ("NRA") implicitly supports Professor Kaden's theory. The NRA wants
to take authority to regulate guns away from local governments, which are more
accountable to their electorate, and give the power to state governments. See Gun Control,
supra note 7.
60. New York 112 S. CL at 2424.
61. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont 1994).
62. McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
63. Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
64. Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994).
65. The original version of the Brady Act, introduced in 1987, made background
checks on purchasers optional, rather than mandatory. HR. 975, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
McGee, the Mississippi case, and Koog, the Texas case, in which the Texas district
court held the background check constitutional, were consolidated for appeal to the Fifth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Strikes Down Gun Checks, supra note 11. The
Department of Justice is allegedly "concerned about the potential adverse impact [of the
cases] on the legality of other state/federal arrangements." Pierre Thomas, The Brady Law
Sheriffs Challenging Federal Authoriy, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1994, at Al.
As of September 19, 1994, enforcement of the background check provision in those
jurisdictions where the provision was held unconstitutional has not been affected because
other law enforcement officials, such as state police, performed the background check
duty. Id.
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sound legal thinking,"' all four courts based their decisions on the
Supreme Court's decision in New York v. United States67 Three courts
specifically mentioned Justice O'Connor's political accountability
rationale.68
All four courts applied the holding in New York to the Brady Act
background check provision because they concluded that the background
check provision constitutes a federal mandate imposed on state officials,
specifically, CLEOs. 69  In New York, the Supreme Court held that
Congress may not "compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program. ' Although the Brady Act does not compel state
legislatures to act affirmatively, the Brady Act does require elected state
officials to act as agents of the federal government by requiring CLEOs
to perform background checks." A clear analogy exists between New
York's prohibition of congressional commandeering of state legislatures
and a congressional mandate that state officials act as federal agents.
The same principle underlying the New York holding thus applies to the
Brady mandate - the principle of political accountability.72
66. Jerome L. Wilson, State Sovereignty Case Shoots at Brady Law, NAT'L L.J., July
11, 1994, at A21.
67. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); see supra notes 36-60 (discussing the New York decision).
68. Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1042; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380; Prints, 854 F. Supp.
at 1514-15. Although the McGee court did not refer specifically to the principle of
political accountability, one can infer that the court took the principle into account as its
opinion relied solely on New York as the basis of its decision. See McGee, 863 F. Supp.
at 325-27.
69. See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 326; Frank 860 F. Supp. at 1041; Mack, 856 F. Supp.
at 1381; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512.
70. New York 112 S. Ct. at 2435.
71. See supra part I. Under the Brady Act, the state acts as an agent of the federal
government because the state becomes a "tool of federal policy." See Texas v. United
States, 730 F.2d. 339, 356 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984). The Brady
Act regulates a state as a state because the law directs state action and determines the
"agenda" of the CLEOs, who are essentially state officials. See Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. United States, 456 U.S. 742, 778-79 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. See supra part II (discussing the principle of political accountability as applied in
New York). The Brady Act probably diminishes political accountability of local elected
officials even more than the legislation at issue in New York. In New York, state officials
could choose which federal mandate to follow and then massage federal policy to reflect
state interests. Although the state legislatures were not free to refuse to adopt the federal
goal, they were free to decide how the state would accomplish the federal goal.
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Regardless of the preferences of the CLEO's constituents, the CLEO
must perform a background check on all handgun purchasers in order to
fulfill the duty imposed by the federal government. The background
check mandate, therefore, undermines political accountability in three
distinct, but interrelated, ways. First, the federal mandate diminishes the
political accountability of CLEOs, and state or locally elected bodies that
fund the CLEOs. These officials might be forced to divert local resources
for conducting the background checks73 from programs their electorates
would prefer. 4  Alternatively, elected officials might raise taxes in
order to meet the resource demands of the federal mandate.75 Either
way, the political accountability of CLEOs and other elected officials is
diminished because the background check provision restricts CLEOs,
state and locally elected officials, from pursuing the policy preferences
of their own electorate. Second, to comply with the Brady Act, CLEOs
must bear the burden of voter dissatisfaction due to resource diversion,
and face responsibility for any incorrect approvals of handgun trans-
fers.76 Third, Congress, state, and locally elected officials become less
politically accountable because their respective electorates will not know
who to hold politically answerable - Congress, which enacted the Brady
Act, or the CLEOs and other local officials, who must reallocate
resources to comply with the mandatory background check.77
Grounding their holdings on the New York case, the four district
courts concluded that the background check provision violated the Tenth
Amendment.S These courts reached this conclusion because Congress
mandated that state elected officials carry out the provision.79 Even if
Congress has "laudable" goals, it is never justified in requiring the states
73. See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (D. Mont. 1994).
74. Id. The preference is assumed because if the background check was the preferred
program, the state would have already had a background check system in place.
75. Id.
76. See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514-15; see also New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
77. See e.g. Kaden, supra note 32, at 870. Local or state officials will likely suffer
the consequences of voter dissatisfaction because they are allocating the state and local
resources. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
78. See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1517-18;
McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
79. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing the four courts'
reasoning).
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to enforce federal legislation."0 Such legislation "undermine[s] the
purpose of federalism - to ensure that the interests of citizens are
adequately represented."'"
IV. THE DECISION HOLDING THE BACKGROUND
CHECK CONSTITUTIONAL
Only the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas, in Koog v. United States, has held that the background check
provision of the Brady Act is consistent with the Tenth Amendment.82
The court began its analysis by reviewing the Supreme Court's prior
Tenth Amendment case law 3 and concluded that no single case
provided the rule of decision.' While the court noted that New York
v. United States held that the federal government could not commandeer
state legislatures, the court claimed that the Federal Energy Rregulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi (FERC) allowed the federal government to impose
"minimal duties on state executive officers." 5 The court focused on the
FERC 6 decision in holding the background check provision constitu-
tional because "the duties imposed on [CLEOs] ... resemble more the
80. E.g., Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1043 ("[Ie Constitution protects us from our own
best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day.") (quoting New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434).
81. Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380 (citing New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2431-32).
82. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
83. Id. at 1381-87. The district court characterized the Supreme Court decisions on
the Tenth Amendment as "a series of shifting perspectives on the nature and breadth of
the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment .... ." Id. at 1381.
84. Id. at 1387.
85. Id. at 1388; cf Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont. 1994).
The Printz court concluded that the duties required of the CLEO in the Brady Act were
not de minimis. Id. The CLEO's duties under the Act could not be regarded as de
mininis because the CLEO must perform a background check on every transfer applicant;
the CLEO must determine the applicable law regarding the eligibility to receive a handgun;
and the CLEO must decide if the handgun transfer is legal. Id. The McGee Court also
distinguished FERC by concluding that the background check mandate was "more than de
mninimis." McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
The Printz court also concluded that FERC's holding did not apply to the Brady Act,
because the FERC decision relied on the Supremacy Clause. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1516.
The sheriff did not claim a violation of the Supremacy Clause in Printz.
86. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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duties created under [the statute at issue in FERC] than the command to
legislate created by the Low-Level Waste Act.""
According to the Koog court, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) required "state utility regulatory bodies [to] consider
federal standards imposed by PURPA and upheld in FERC."5 Specifi-
cally, the Koog court referred to Titles I and I of PURPA, which
"direct[ed] state utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities
to 'consider' the adoption and implementation of specific [federal] rate
designs and regulatory standards."'89 However, PURPA did not require
state utility commissions or nonregulated utilities to adopt or implement
PURPA's federal rate design or regulatory standards?0 More important-
ly, PURPA did not require consideration of the federal standards if the
state did not have a utilities commission or if the state stopped regulating
the utilities within its borders.9 '
87. Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1388.
88. Id.
89. FERC, 456 U.S. at 746. In FERC, Mississippi challenged the provisions of Title
I, Title El, and § 210 of Title II of PURPA, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2601) (1988), on the grounds that they violated the
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. FERC, 456 U.S. at 759. The Supreme Court
identified PURPA as an attempt by the federal government to "use State regulatory
machinery to advance federal goals." Id. at 759.
The Supreme Court first looked at § 210 of Title II, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(1),
concerning state implementation of FERC standards, and implied that the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2, enabled Congress to expand the jurisdiction of the
Mississippi Commission. FBRC, 456 U.S. at 760-61 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947)). The Court held that "state agencies, like state courts, have a duty to adjudicate
claims arising under federal law." La Pierre, supra note 34, at 660, n.424. The Court
pointed out that the type of adjudication at issue was the same type as that "customarily
engaged in" under Mississippi law. FERC, 456 U.S. at 760.
The Supreme Court then declared that the second challenged provision of PURPA,
mandatory consideration of federal standards by the States in Titles I and I, also did not
violate the Tenth Amendment. FERC, 456 U.S. at 769-70. The Court held that state
consideration of federal standards was not "mandatory," because states could still choose
not to have a utility commission or could stop regulating in the field. Id. at 764.
The final challenged provision of PURPA in Titles I and III "require[d] State
commissioners to follow certain notice and comment procedures when acting on the
proposed federal standards." FERC, 456 U.S. at 770. The Supreme Court held this
procedural requirement constitutional and implied the requirement was "procedural
minima." Id. at 771.
90. FERC, 456 U.S. at 750.
91. Id. at 764.
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The distinguishing feature between PURPA and the Brady Act is not
the number of state duties created, but the manner in which Congress
directed the accomplishment of those duties. Congress did not force the
minimal duties imposed by PURPA on the states. Justice Blackmun, the
author of the majority opinion in FERC, explained that states could
choose whether to implement the federal policy under PURPA. 2 Under
PURPA, the states could discontinue regulating the utilities within the
state and leave the regulatory responsibility in the hands of the federal
government.93 The important point is that the states retained a choice.
Only if federal laws give state and local officials a choice do all officials
remain politically accountable, because the electorate can identify the
party responsible for a given decision.94 The fact that the states had a
choice under PURPA distinguishes the PURPA provisions at issue in
FERC from the background check provision of the Brady Act.
The background check provision of the Brady Act does not give
states a choice; it imposes a mandate on the states. 5 The Koog court
erroneously concluded that the background check provision was optional
for CLEOs. The Koog court held that the CLEO has great discretion in
defining a "reasonable" background check, including determining that not
conducting a background check is "reasonable."9' But Congress
intended to require affirmative action by CLEOs when it used the word
"shall" in the statute.' An amendment to replace the language "shall
92. Id. at 766.
93. Id. at 766-67. According to Justice Blackinun, Congress may enact legislation to
induce states to participate as actors in federal legislation. Id.
94. Kaden, supra note 32, at 856-57.
95. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
96. Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1388. No other court ruling on this issue found that a
CLEO could choose not to conduct a background check. See supra part III (discussing
the other court rulings on the constitutionality of the Brady Act's background check provi-
sion).
The Koog court based its conclusion on an Open Letter to State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).
Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1379. The Vermont District Court in Frank dismissed this Open
Letter because courts only give weight to agency interpretation of a statute when the intent
of Congress is unclear. Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (D. Vt. 1994)
(citing Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45). The Frank court found Congress' intent
clear - the background checks were not optional. 860 F. Supp at 1040.
97. See Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1040.
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make a reasonable effort" with "may make a reasonable effort,"' in
order to make the background check provision optional, was defeated. 9
Courts have also pointed out that the clause "including available criminal
history records" implies that checking available records is a minimal
requirement."° The background check provision is a mandate on the
states, and as such, is distinguishable from FERC. Rather, it is New York
that provides the proper analysis of the background check provision.
Thus the Koog court's holding that the background check is optional runs
counter to the plain meaning of the statute and the import of the
legislative history.
V. EVALUATION
Although no Supreme Court precedent speaks directly to whether
Congress may require states to enforce federal legislation,' the
rationale exists for declaring such mandates inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment.1 2 In New York, Congress violated the Tenth Amendment
when it compelled states to legislate under the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act. 3 The New York Court based its holding in part on
98. H.R. REP. 344, supra note 7, at 38-39. Congressman Steve Schiff endorsed
making the background check optional "if Congress is unwilling to conduct the check
federally, or reimburse local law enforcement agencies for doing it." Id. at 39 (dissenting
views of Rep. Steve Schiff).
99. H.R. REP. 344, supra note 7, at 14-15. The Printz court concluded that the
background check is mandatory based on other legislative history. See Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1512 (D. Mont. 1994).
100. Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1041 (D. Mont. 1994); McGee v.
United States, 863 F. Supp. 323, 326 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
101. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Amendments Act in New York
essentially required states to regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated
within their borders or take-title to the waste. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2416. That Act did
not require states to simply enforce federal legislation, as the Brady Act's background
check provision does.
102. See La Pierre, supra note 34, at 660, n.423. Professor La Pierre states:
The argument that mandatory state enforcement of national regulatory programs is
unconstitutional is completely consistent with the lessons of history. Since the first
administration of President Washington, Congress has relied on state assistance in the
implementation of national law. Congress, however, has sought voluntary state
cooperation and only in rare instances has it attempted to impose a duty directly on
the states.
Id.
103. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2435; see supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice O'Connor's rationale in New York).
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the principle of accountability. °  That principle also applies to the
Brady Act's background check provision, under which Congress forced
the states to act as agents of the federal government. 15 Requiring
states to enforce federal law makes all elected officials less politically
accountable and undermines representative democracy.' °6
Like the take-title provision at issue in New York, the background
check provision forces state officials to act affirmatively under congres-
sional mandate.0 7 Under the Brady Act, state and local officials bear
the primary political responsibility for the acts of federal decision-
makers, 8 contrary to the plan of our federalist democracy."19 Due
104. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
105. According to New York, the federal government avoids accountability for federal
programs by compelling the states to legislate according to Congress' direction. Id.
Conversely, state and local officials become politically accountable for programs compelled
by the federal government. Id. When forced to carry out federal programs, the state and
local officials must redirect resources from programs their constituents support.
106. Cf La Pierre, supra note 34, at 663. Professor La Pierre argues that because the
political process usually polices incursions on state power by Congress the situation
generally does not warrant judicial intervention. Under Professor La Pierre's analysis,
however, the Brady Act's background check provision falls under an exception justifyingjudicial intervention. Id. at 656-63. According to Professor La Pierre, congressional
action warrants judicial intervention to protect state autonomy when (1) the congressional
action does not substantively affect private activity and (2) Congress bears no administra-
tive or financial cost for its action. Id. at 657. Under these circumstances, the national
electorate will not hold Congress accountable for limiting state autonomy, and the courts
must intervene. Id. at 660.
The application of national standards to handgun purchases is a political check on the
substantive policy, but it fails to protect against the decrease in state autonomy caused by
the congressional action. See id at 660. Additionally, although Congress did allot certain
money to the states to fund the establishment of state criminal databases, the purpose of
the funds is to facilitate the final national database of criminal records. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3759(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993). Thus, the funds do not alleviate the administrative and
financial burden on CLEOs to comply with the background check provision. Id. See also
H.R. REP.344, supra note 7, at 36 (dissenting views of Congressman Steve Schiff).
Congressman Schiff stated that, although the Congress authorized funds to assist states in
creating a computer database of state criminal records, these funds "cannot be used by
state or local law enforcement agencies to offset the cost of performing the individual
personal background checks." Id. He had previously offered an amendment to provide
funding for the background check mandate, but it was defeated. Id. at 36-37.
107. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
108. Id.
109. Cf. La Pierre, supra note 34 at 665 (stating that "if Congress is not politically
accountable ... judicially imposed restrictions on Congress' powers are necessary to
protect the states').
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to the principle of accountability, the Brady Act's mandate for states to
enforce federal regulations is a clearer violation of the Tenth Amendment
than the take-title provision. At least in requiring states to carry out
federal regulatory programs the constituents may legitimately hold the
state officials accountable for how the federal program is implemented
in the state.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the Supreme Court's protection of state autonomy
through the principle of political accountability, the mandatory back-
ground check provision of the Brady Act will not survive. The courts
must protect state autonomy when the federal government compels state
officials to enforce federal legislation, and thereby diminishes the
political accountability of elected officials. By forcing state officials to
implement a federal program without allocating any national resources
for the states to use, federal officials simply pass the hard decisions of
resource allocation to state officials and avoid political accountability to
the national electorate."' o Unable to identify the decisionmakers, voters
lose the benefit of political accountability and the ability to influence
elected officials about resource allocation.1" If the federal government
wants state officials to enforce the background check provisions of the
Brady Act, Congress must give states the choice of whether or not to
enforce the background check provision. Only this way will Congress
follow the Tenth Amendment and maintain political accountability, the
foundation of our federalist system of government.
Jennifer A. Wiegleb*
110. See Kaden, supra note 32, at 857-68 (describing how changing the internal and
external relationships of Congress contributed to a "decline of states' influence upon the
federal government"). If liberty and political participation continue to thrive, Professor
Kaden believes protection of state autonomy may adjust to the "needs and habits of the
nation." Id. at 897.
111. See Kaden, supra note 32, at 889.
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